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I. INTRODUCTION
Holmes laughed. 'Watson insists that I am the dramatist in real life,' said he. 'Some
touch of the artist wells up within me, and calls insistently for a well-staged
performance. Surely our profession, Mr. Mac, would be a drab and sordid one if we did
not sometimes set the scene so as to glorify our results. The blunt accusation, the brutal
tap upon the shoulder-what can one make of such a denouement? But the quick
inference, the subtle trap, the clever forecast of coming events, the triumphant
vindication of bold theories-are these not the pride and the justification of our life's
1
work?'

A hallmark of Sherlock Holmes is his ability to solve complex
crimes with well-staged performances. His flair for the shrewd and
dramatic apprehension of a suspect in an inscrutable case often left
his loyal companion Watson in awe, the local police investigators
mystified, and the perpetrator thwarted. Holmes's admirers
speculated that he must have had a special gift, maybe even psychic
powers, which allowed him to solve any case. In reality, as Holmes
always explained to his slow-witted companions, it was his insightful,
rational, and logical approach to solving the mystery that inexorably
led him to the solution.
Depictions of modern-day profilers are similar to depictions of
Holmes, as they relate stories about bold predictions that eventually
are vindicated. For example, a popular account of one of the first
profilers, a psychiatrist named James A. Brussel, relates how he was
contacted by police in 1957 to assist in identifying the "Mad Bomber"
of New York, who was responsible for over thirty bombings in the
city. 2 After poring over photographs of the bomb scenes and letters
from the bomber to newspapers, Dr. Brussel issued the following
directive to police in a city in Connecticut: "Look for a heavy man.
Foreign born. Roman Catholic. Single. Lives with a brother or sister.
When you find him, chances are he'll be wearing a double-breasted
suit. Buttoned." Based on this profile, police identified a suspect
named George Metesky. Metesky matched the profile in almost every
respect. Indeed, when the officers, after arriving at his house to arrest
him, asked him to get dressed for the trip to the station, he emerged in
a double-breasted suit.., buttoned.
John Douglas, a profiler for the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI") and the inspiration for the character Jack

1.
2 SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Valley of Fear, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES
229, 283 (2003).
2.
For the relevant facts of this account, see JOHN DOUGLAS & MARK OLSHAKER,
MINDHUNTER: INSIDE THE FBI'S ELITE SERIAL CRIME UNIT 21 (1995) [hereinafter DOUGLAS &
OLSHAKER, MINDHUNTER].
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Crawford in the novel and movie The Silence of the Lambs, 3 recounts a
similar story.4 Assisting in the investigation of unsolved murders that
occurred along hiking paths in heavily wooded areas around San
Francisco, Douglas presented a profile to a crowded room of sheriffs
deputies and investigators, describing a white blue-collar worker in
his low- to mid-thirties with an IQ well above normal. After asserting
that the offender would have a background of bed-wetting, firestarting, and cruelty to animals, Douglas gave a pregnant pause and
added: "Another thing ...the killer will have a speech impediment."
According to Douglas, the officers in the room reacted skeptically, one
even asking sarcastically if he came to that conclusion because the
stab wounds looked like "stutter stab[s]." Like Holmes, Douglas was
vindicated when police arrested a suspect who closely resembled the
5
profile, all the way down to his lifelong stutter.
However, the similarities between modern-day profilers and
Holmes become more important and consequential when the dramatic
flair and glorified results extend beyond investigative work and enter
the criminal courts as expert testimony. Douglas and other FBI agents
from the Behavioral Analysis Unit ("BAU") have refined and
popularized the offender profiling techniques originally developed by
6
Dr. Brussel and BAU founders Howard Teten and Patrick Mullany.
Offender profiling originally was developed to assist local law
enforcement in narrowing leads and identifying suspects in difficult
serial killer and rapist cases. 7 Not long after its widespread adoption
in such investigations, profilers began assisting in the prosecution of
these crimes.8 Scholars have not explored whether courts admit or
reject expert offender profiling testimony, perhaps because they have
assumed that judges would rarely, if ever, admit it in criminal trials
because it represents improper character testimony. 9 However, this

3.

THOMAS HARRIS, THE SILENCE OF THE LAMBS 1-5 (1988); THE SILENCE OF THE LAMBS

(Orion Pictures 1991); see also DOUGLAS & OLSHAKER, MINDHUNTER, supranote 2, at 171-72.
4.
For the relevant facts of this account, see DOUGLAS & OLSHAKER, MINDHUNTER, supra
note 2, at 148-56.
5.
The analogy to Holmes has support from Douglas himself, who considers a comparison
to the fictional sleuth "the highest compliment." Id. at 20.
6.
Id. at 81. The BAU's original title was the "Behavioral Science Unit." To maintain
consistency and reduce confusion, this Note employs the abbreviation "BAU" throughout. For
additional information about the BAU, see the Investigative Programs Critical Incident
Response Group Home Page, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/isd/cirg/ncavc.htm#bau (last visited Oct. 14,
2007).
7.

DOUGLAS & OLSHAKER, MINDHUNTER, supra note 2, at 94-96.

8. See infra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing techniques of offender profiling).
9.
See D. Michael Risinger & Jeffrey L. Loop, Three Card Monte, Monty Hall, Modus
Operandi and "Offender Profiling' Some Lessons of Modern Cognitive Science for the Law of
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Note demonstrates that offender profiling testimony frequently is
offered as scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge, rather
than character testimony, and correspondingly is evaluated and
occasionally admitted as expert testimony.
This Note also argues that offender profiling should not be
admissible as expert testimony. Judges traditionally evaluated expert
testimony under the "general acceptance" standard articulated in Frye
v. United States, which requires judges to determine whether a
technique generally is accepted by the relevant scientific community
before expert testimony can be admitted. 1° Although some state courts
still retain the Frye standard, federal courts and an increasing
number of state courts now scrutinize expert testimony according to
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 ("Rule 702"). This rule codified the
Supreme Court decisions in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.11 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 2 which together established
new standards for scientific and nonscientific expert witness
testimony in federal court. 13 Daubert and Kumho Tire identify trial
judges as the "gatekeepers" of expert witness testimony in the
courtroom and require judges to determine whether testimony is
scientifically reliable before permitting its admission. 14 Accordingly,
this Note argues that state and federal judges should not admit expert
offender profiling testimony under Rule 702, state rules equivalent to
Rule 702, or the Frye standard because it lacks both evidentiary
reliability and general acceptance.15
Although the existing scholarly literature generally focuses on
expert profiling testimony that attempts to link multiple crimes to a
single offender ("linkage analysis"), this Note does not address linkage
analysis for two reasons. First, other scholars already have
Evidence, 24 CARDOzO L. REV. 193, 253 (2002) (indicating that courts have generally rejected
testimony frankly concerning profiling).
10. 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
11. 509 U.S. 579, 588-90 (1993) (holding that "general acceptance" is not required for
scientific evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence, and that it is incumbent upon the trial judge
simply to ensure testimony is based upon a reliable foundation and is relevant).
12. 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (holding that Daubert applies to all expert testimony, not just
scientific testimony).
13. Although Rule 702 and the Supreme Court decisions relate to federal standards, many
state legislatures have adopted the same language of Rule 702, and state courts often rely on
Frye, Daubert, and Kumho Tire when interpreting equivalent state rules. See, e.g., David E.
Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the States, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 351, 35665 (2004) (stating that by mid-2003, 27 states had adopted Daubert, while some states had
retained Frye, and the remainder had rejected Frye but had not fully adopted Daubert).
14. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598.
15. As discussed in more detail infra Subsection II.B.2, Daubert defines evidentiary
reliability as scientific validity, or trustworthiness.

2008]

OFFENDERPROFILING

demonstrated some of the theoretical and methodological deficiencies
of linkage analysis and have analyzed judicial decisions addressing its
admissibility.' 6 Second, linkage analysis is premised on essentially the
same fundamental assumptions as offender profiling; therefore, by
exposing the deficiencies of offender profiling, this Note supplements
existing scholarship that criticizes linkage analysis.
Part II of this Note discusses the history, goals, theories, and
application of offender profiling to criminal investigations and
prosecutions. This Part also describes the history and current status of
judicial standards for the admission of expert testimony. Part III
begins with a critical assessment of the theory and methodology of
offender profiling and argues that it is not suitable for expert
testimony. In addition, this Part examines how courts have treated
expert offender profiling testimony and attempts to explain decisions
to admit the testimony despite its unreliability. Part IV proposes a
solution to the problems identified in Part III, primarily arguing for a
judicial presumption against admitting expert testimony related to
disciplines developed principally for the investigation and prosecution
of crimes.

II. UNDERSTANDING OFFENDER PROFILING AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. Offender Profiling
The scientific study of criminology began in the late nineteenth
century. From the beginning, theorists have attempted to predict
17
criminality based on physical, mental, and psychological attributes.
Cesare Lombroso, a nineteenth-century criminologist, pioneered this
approach, as he theorized that physical attributes are related to
personality traits and that criminals possess identifiable physical
attributes that indicate their failure to evolve. 18 Lombroso posited that
the "born criminal" could be identified by characteristics held over
from remote ancestors, such as large jaws, broad sloping foreheads,
hard shifty eyes, long arms, and hawk-like noses. 19 Most of Lombroso's
theories were discredited quickly, but new approaches to predicting

16.

Risinger & Loop, supra note 9.

17. JOHN DOUGLAS ET AL., CRIME CLASSIFICATION MANUAL: A STANDARD
INVESTIGATING AND CLASSIFYING VIOLENT CRIMES 3-8 (2d ed. 2006).
18.

SYSTEM FOR

CESARE LOMBROSO, CRIMINAL MAN 45, 50-57, 117 (Mary Gibson & Nicole Rafter trans.,

Duke University Press 2006) (1876).
19. Id. at 51-52.
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criminality based on mental, physical, and personality characteristics
20
continued to emerge throughout the twentieth century.
Although the prediction of future criminality based on the
physical or psychological characteristics of individuals has a long
history, it is only since the 1970s that investigators have engaged in a
systematic effort to profile the personality characteristics of unknown
offenders by examining crime scene evidence. Subsection 1 defines key
terms and discusses the historical development of offender profiling
using crime scene evidence. Subsection 2 explores the goals of
profiling, its theoretical underpinnings, and the mechanics of its
application as an investigative tool. Finally, Subsection 3 identifies
how profiling is extended to applications beyond the investigations,
particularly to criminal trials.
1. Historical Origin
In the 1970s, Howard Teten and Patrick Mullany, members of
the BAU, pioneered a technique that became known as "offender
profiling," in which profilers examined crime scenes in order to predict
offender behavior and motives that would aid in offender
identification. 2 1 Teten and Mullany initially assisted local law
enforcement in narrowing leads or identifying potential suspects by
producing informal profiles derived primarily from their experiences
22
in the field and their extrapolations from psychological literature.
Within a few years, other members of the BAU, John Douglas and
Robert Ressler, began interviewing prisoners informally to ascertain
their motivations and learn about their behavior both before and after
their offenses. 23 Encouraged by these initial interviews, the BAU

20. DOUGLAS ET AL., supra note 17, at 4-6 (describing the progression from Lombroso's
theories to theories that attributed criminality to defective intelligence or insanity, and
eventually to multiple theories and typologies that focused on defective personalities).
21. DOUGLAS & OLSHAKER, MINDHUNTER, supranote 2, at 81. See also id. at 95 (noting the
initial skepticism in the "Hoover days" of the Bureau toward behavioral science and the practice
of profiling). "Offender profiling" often is termed simply "profiling." The former is more precise,
however, as a means of differentiating this practice from the controversial practice of racial
profiling or other types of profiling in which investigators use stereotypical characteristics to pick
out, for example, suspected terrorists or drug couriers. The admissibility of expert testimony
related to drug courier profiles is a complex issue that is not addressed in this Note.
22. Id. at 94-96.
23. Id. at 99. Douglas and Ressler began conducting these interviews in the late 1970s. Id.
at 111. Typically, they would conduct their interviews whenever official business, usually
conducting local training sessions, brought them near a prison holding a notable prisoner.
Within a few months, the agents were able to interview several notable serial killers and wouldbe assassins, including Ed Kemper (murdered six college-aged women, his grandmother and
grandfather, his mother, and his mother's friend), Arthur Bremmer (attempted assassination of
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launched a formal project to collect data about violent criminals and
their crimes and to synthesize that data into an organized and useful
investigative framework. 24 This project resulted in the creation of a
tool to help investigators classify violent crimes based on information
about the victim, the crime scene, and the nature of the exchange
25
between the victim and the offender.
2. Goals, Theories, and Method of Offender Profiling
Originally, BAU profilers primarily assisted local law
enforcement with serial murder and serial rape investigations, as
these crimes pose unique challenges at the local level. 26 Specifically, a
victim of this type of crime often is targeted opportunistically by a
27
repeat offender who commits crimes across multiple jurisdictions.
The goal of the profile is to narrow a pool of suspects, sift through
thousands of leads, or provide new leads. 28 Over time, profilers began
using their techniques for other purposes: to provide interrogation
strategies to law enforcement, to assist prosecutors in developing
cross-examination strategies, to determine the seriousness of
threatening letters, or to set traps in the media to flush out
29
offenders.

presidential candidate George Wallace), Sara Jane Moore and Lynette "Squeaky" Fromme
(attempted assassination of Gerald Ford), and Charles Manson. Id.
24. Id. at 117-18. The agents of the BAU recruited Ann Burgess, a professor of psychiatric
mental health nursing, to assist in developing more rigorous methods of data collection and
analysis. Burgess developed a fifty-seven page instrument to code responses of thirty-six
prisoners, mostly serial killers, interviewed by the BAU agents. The agents also compiled
detailed descriptions of each crime scene. Burgess subsequently performed analyses of the data.
Id.
25. DOUGLAS ETAL., supra note 17, at 6-11.
26. Robert J. Homant & Daniel B. Kennedy, Psychological Aspects of Crime Scene
Profiling-ValidityResearch, 25 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 319, 321 (1998).

27. Id. These characteristics pose unique challenges because the offender has no preexisting
relationship with the victim, so it is difficult to identify suspects and uncover leads. In addition,
crimes committed across jurisdictions involve multiple law enforcement agencies, which creates
difficultly in coordinating investigations and facilitating awareness of similar crimes in
neighboring jurisdictions.
28. Id. at 322.
29. Id. at 322-23. For example, after Douglas developed a profile for the killer of a twelveyear-old girl, police indicated that they had previously interviewed a suspect who substantially
met the profile. Police were about to give him a polygraph, as the previous interrogations were
unsuccessful, but based on his profile of the killer, Douglas suggested that police instead reinterview the suspect at night in a room that contained the murder weapon and stacks of boxes
with the suspect's name on them. He also told the police to sympathize with the suspect and
project blame onto the victim. The police followed his advice and the interrogation resulted in a
full confession. DOUGLAS & OLSHAKER, MINDHUNTER, supra note 2, at 189-91.
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The validity of offender profiling and its value to law
enforcement depends on two fundamental assumptions: First, that a
specific class of offenders exhibits similar behavioral traits that
persist over time. 30 Second, that a particular offender's behavioral
traits are consistent across crimes and also affect non-criminal aspects
of the offender's personality and lifestyle. 3' If these assumptions are
valid, then a profiler can ascertain characteristics of the offender who
committed a crime by examining the crime scene for expressions of
specific behavioral traits. Once a profiler has identified traits of an
offender, he can extrapolate theories about other aspects of the
32
offender's personality and lifestyle.
For profiling to narrow leads effectively, the identified
behavioral traits must distinguish the offender from others in the
same class; that is, within each class of offenders, there must be
reliably identifiable subtypes. 33 As a result, much of the BAU's
research has focused on identifying subtypes of offenders based on the
motives for their crimes. 34 The culmination of this research, the Crime
35
ClassificationManual, is organized principally according to motive.
For example, murder is divided into four broad groups, each of which
has multiple subgroups. 36 A profiler classifies a crime into a motive
category by assessing multiple variables: victimology, crime scene
indicators frequently noted for a specific subtype, forensic findings

30. Homant & Kennedy, supra note 26, at 328. This is essentially a narrow application of
trait theory. Unfortunately, most psychological research suggests that traits exhibit little
consistency across time and situations, and that different traits do not accurately predict
different personality types. Id.
31. See id. ("[Cirime scene profiling rests on the assumption that at least certain offenders
have consistent behavioral traits."); see also DOUGLAS ET AL., supra note 17, at 21-22 (discussing
the notion that some "criminal conduct goes beyond the actions necessary to perpetrate the
crime-the modus operandi-and points to the unique personality of the offender").
32. See Homant & Kennedy, supra note 26, at 328 (noting that antisocial behavior, for
instance, might "be an especially stable behavior trait for aggressive persons-whether because
their personalities do not change much, the genetic contribution remains constant, or they tend
to remain in aggression-fostering environments").
33. Id. at 328-29. For example, the behavioral traits of a particular serial rapist must be
distinguishable from the general behavioral traits of known serial rapists. Id. Otherwise, the
profile could only serve to identify that a serial rapist is responsible for a given crime, but would
offer no additional details to distinguish one serial rapist from another.
34. DOUGLAS ET AL., supra note 17, at 98 (describing the FBI's decision in the 1980s to
develop a systematic classification by motive for murder, arson, and sexual assault).
35. See id. (identifying the Crime Classification Manual as a "motivational model for
classification of homicide").
36. Id. For example, murder motivated by "personal cause" includes: erotomania-motivated
killing, domestic killing, argument murder, conflict murder, authority killing, revenge killing,
nonspecific motive killing, extremist murder, mercy/hero homicide, and hostage murder. Id. at
93, 153-220.
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frequently noted for a specific subtype, crime scene staging, and other
37
investigative considerations.
Douglas classifies these considerations into seven discrete
steps that can be followed to generate a profile of the offender: (1)
evaluate the criminal act; (2) evaluate the specifics of the crime scene
(including the surrounding area); (3) analyze the victim (considering
lifestyle and behavior prior to incident); (4) evaluate police reports; (5)
evaluate the medical examiner's autopsy report; (6) develop a profile
with critical offender characteristics; and (7) formulate investigative
suggestions based on the profile.38 The profile is intended to render a
comprehensive picture of the offender, including "gender, age, race or
ethnicity, level of intelligence or schooling, military service status, job
status, living circumstances, nature of interpersonal relationships,
and even the make and color of the perpetrator's car."39 Law
enforcement then uses this comprehensive profile to supplement its
investigation.
Profilers tend to focus on a few specific variables to distinguish
offenders when reviewing the crime scene, victim characteristics,
forensic data, and other evidence used to generate a profile. 40 One of
the primary variables is the organization of the crime scene, which
profilers treat as characteristic of the offender himself. 41 The BAU
asserts that the differences between organized and disorganized
offenders
persist
across
their
personality
characteristics,
socioeconomic backgrounds, and crime scene behaviors. 42 For example,
with respect to personality and socioeconomic factors, organized
offenders are described as more intelligent, more socially competent,
more likely to live with a partner, more likely to commit offenses in
response to precipitating situational stress, more likely to be employed
in skilled work, and more likely to drive a car in good condition than
disorganized offenders.43 Regarding crime scene differences, organized
offenders are more likely than disorganized offenders to plan the
offense, target a stranger, use restraints, hide the body, remove the
weapon or other evidence from the crime scene, and personalize the

37.

Id. at 8-12.

38. JOHN DOUGLAS & MARK OLSHAKER, JOURNEY INTO DARKNESS 26 (1997) [hereinafter
DOUGLAS & OLSHAKER, JOURNEY].

39. Homant & Kennedy, supra note 26, at 321-22.
40. Id. at 331.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Robert Ressler & Ann Burgess, Crime Scene and Profile Characteristicsof Organized
and DisorganizedMurderers,54 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Aug. 1985, at 18.
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victim. 44 In practice, on a spectrum ranging from purely organized to
purely disorganized behaviors, most offenders fall somewhere in
between, thus complicating the inferences a profiler can make based
45
on the evidence at the crime scene.
Offender profiling arguably has become a useful tool for
investigators to narrow the list of possible suspects and generate new
leads in uniquely challenging serial murder and rape cases,
particularly those committed against random victims and spanning
46
multiple jurisdictions.
3. Offender Profiling in the Courtroom
It was Holmes who broke the silence. 'Our difficulties are not over,' he remarked,
shaking his head. 'Our police work ends, but our legal work begins.' 47

Offender profiling now is applied to contexts outside of criminal
investigations. Due largely to the efforts of FBI profilers, offender
profiling has entered the arena of criminal prosecutions. Not long
after its genesis, members of the BAU, like the fictional Holmes,
extended offender profiling beyond investigations into legal
applications. 48 Profilers initially provided strategic advice to
prosecutors, 49 but they eventually asserted a more active role in
criminal prosecutions by serving as witnesses.50 From the beginning,
prosecutors presented profilers as expert witnesses, perhaps because

44. Id.
45. DOUGLAS ET AL., supra note 17, at 10; Homant & Kennedy, supranote 26, at 332.
46. Homant & Kennedy, supranote 26, at 338 (describing an FBI study in 1981 finding that
when one was used, a profile helped identify the suspect in 17% of solved cases and, according to
law enforcement statements, was "of at least some help" in 83% of solved cases).
47. DOYLE, The Adventure of Wisteria Lodge, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES, supra
note 1, at 371, 379.
48. DOUGLAS & OLSHAKER, MINDHUNTER, supra note 2, at 198-224. The first legal
application arose when FBI agents created a profile of the killer responsible for the famous
Atlanta child murders from 1979-1981. The profilers suggested multiple strategies for catching
the perpetrator, resulting in the arrest of Wayne Williams. The district attorney then asked the
profilers to assist the prosecution in developing its trial strategy. Id. at 212-17. The publicity
surrounding the case and the FBI's role in its prosecution resulted in national prominence for the
new offender profiling program. Id. at 224.
49. Id. at 217.
50. DOUGLAS & OLSHAKER, JOURNEY, supra note 38, at 293-95. The first time a member of
the BAU testified as an expert witness, the testimony was not used to link the defendant to a
profile nor to establish him as the killer. Instead, it was admitted strictly to refute the defense's
claim that the defendant's calm behavior after the murders took place was inconsistent with
behavior normally displayed by murderers. Anthoney v. State, No. A-2755, 1993 WL 13156613,
at *7 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 17, 1993) (affirming the trial court's admission of the BAU member
as an expert to "rebut an intuitive conclusion that [the defendant] wanted to exploit: that the
person who committed the murders would necessarily exhibit extreme emotional symptoms").
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prosecutors assumed that courts rarely would admit offender profilers
as character evidence. Rather than directly asserting that a defendant
fits the profile of a certain kind of offender, profiling experts were
proffered to educate factfinders about crime scene classification,
including behavioral characteristics such as "organization" and
"disorganization," and to discuss in general terms how these features
51
relate to offenders' motivations.
In addition, members of the BAU, led by Douglas, created a
new application of profiling called "linkage analysis" with the explicit
goal of gaining admission as expert witnesses. 52 In linkage analysis,
profilers examine multiple crime scenes and attempt to link them to a
single offender. Like offender profiling, linkage analysis assumes that
individual behavior, especially criminal behavior, is consistent across
time and multiple crime scenes. However, linkage analysis goes a step
beyond offender profiling: where offender profiling assumes that
behavioral traits can distinguish a subtype of offender from the
general class of the same kind of offenders, linkage analysis actually
assumes that behavioral traits can distinguish a particular offender
from the entire population of offenders.
Before considering how courts have responded to profilers'
efforts to create admissible forms of expert testimony, this Note will
summarize the statutory and common law standards for the
admissibility of expert testimony.
B. Admissibility of Expert Testimony
The U.S. legal system has a long history of admitting expert
testimony to aid factfinders in their decisionmaking duties. Until the
early twentieth century, courts freely allowed qualified experts to
provide relevant testimony on matters that likely were beyond the
average juror's range of knowledge. 53 In the twentieth century,
however, as the pace and quantity of scientific research exploded, the
distinction between cutting-edge discoveries and junk science became

51. This strategy is discussed in more detail infra Section III.B.
52. This Note will not present a thorough explication of linkage analysis but will instead
describe the assumptions it shares with offender profiling in order to demonstrate that they rely
on the same principles. For thorough discussions of linkage analysis, see Risinger & Loop, supra
note 9, which criticizes linkage analysis, and DOUGLAS & OLSHAKER, JOURNEY, supra note 38, at
39, which describes Douglas's theory on signature evidence and how he applies it to link crimes.
53. See TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE: THE HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC
EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 250 (2004) (explaining that the admissibility of

expert testimony was subject to two traditional evidentiary criteria: its logical relevance and
helpfulness to a jury, and the qualifications of the witness).
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difficult for many courts to discern. 54 Courts therefore began
establishing standards to determine the admissibility of expert
testimony. Subsection 1 discusses the initial admissibility standards
developed in the twentieth century, including the 1923 Court of
Appeals decision in Frye v. United States55 and the 1975 Federal Rules
of Evidence. Subsection 2 explores the more recent developments in
admissibility standards triggered by the Supreme Court's decision in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. 56 Both standards are
relevant to a discussion of the admissibility of expert profiling
testimony because some states continue to retain the Frye standard,
while other states have elected to follow the new federal standard
57
established by Daubert.
1. General Acceptance of Frye and the Old Rule 702
For most of the twentieth century, Frye governed the
admissibility of expert testimony in federal courts. In Frye, the
defendant was convicted of murder based in part on a confession he
gave to a police investigator. 58 The defendant asserted that the
confession was false and sought to introduce an expert's testimony
that he passed a lie detection test as proof.59 The lie detector test was
premised on the theory that systolic blood pressure displays a certain
pattern when a person is untruthful.6 0 The trial court excluded the
expert's testimony, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court's
exclusion.6 ' The court held that for a novel scientific principle or
discovery to be admissible, it "must be sufficiently established to have
62
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."
While commentators criticized the holding as too inflexible to
accommodate cutting-edge techniques that were not yet widely
accepted by scientists,6 3 this decision established the dominant

54. 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 6266 (Supp. 2006).
55. 293 F. 1013, 1013-14 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
56. 509 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1993).
57. See Bernstein & Jackson, supra note 13 (discussing admissibility standards currently
adopted by the different states).
58. GOLAN, supra note 53, at 245.
59. Id.
60. 293 F. at 1013-14.
61.

Id.

62.
63.

Id. at 1014.
WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 54.
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standard for admissibility of novel scientific evidence that remained in
64
place for the next seventy years.
In 1975, when the Federal Rules were enacted, Rule 702
codified the standard for the admissibility of expert testimony. 65 Rule
702 employed a more liberal approach than Frye, allowing admission
of scientific, technical, or other specialized testimony if it "will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence." 66 Unfortunately, the
Federal Rules conflicted with Frye, thereby creating confusion as to
67
whether Frye remained good law in federal court.
2. The DaubertTrilogy and the New Rule 702
The Supreme Court resolved this confusion in Daubert, holding
that Rule 702 superseded Frye.68 But while the Court addressed this
question, it also interpreted Rule 702, introducing additional
confusion regarding the exact nature of the trial court's evaluation of
expert testimony. In Daubert, two minors and their parents brought
suit against Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals alleging that the drug
Bendectin, taken by the children's mothers to prevent nausea during
pregnancy, was the cause of the children's major birth defects.6 9 In its
motion for summary judgment, the defense presented an affidavit
from a doctor who, relying on several published studies, asserted that
Bendectin did not cause birth defects. The plaintiffs attempted to
admit the testimony of eight experts to refute the defense witness, but
the trial court held that the methods employed by the plaintiffs'
experts did not satisfy Frye's general acceptance requirement. The
district court awarded summary judgment in favor of the defense, and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
decision to exclude the testimony.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and Justice Blackmun,
writing for the majority, asserted that the Federal Rules of Evidence
superseded Frye.70 In interpreting Rule 702, the Court emphasized the
"gatekeeping" duty of trial judges "to ensure that any and all scientific
64. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993).
65. Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926.
66. Id. This language has been referred to as the "helpfulness" requirement. Daubert, 509
U.S. at 591-92.
67. Compare Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the
Frye standard did not survive the enactment of the Federal Rules), with U.S. v. Smith, 869 F.2d
348, 350-51 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the Frye standard did survive the enactment of the
Federal Rules).
68. 509 U.S. at 587.
69. For the relevant facts of this case, see id. at 582-84.
70. Id. at 587.
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71
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."
The Court also interpreted the "helpfulness" language of Rule 702 as
conferring responsibility on trial judges to ensure the existence of a
valid scientific connection between the testimony offered and the facts
of the case.7 2 This requires trial judges to make an initial inquiry to
determine "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid." 73 The Court identified five factors to
assist trial judges in making this determination: (1) whether the
scientific theory or technique can and has been tested; (2) whether the
theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication;
(3) the technique's known or potential rate of error; (4) the existence
and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation;
and (5) whether the technique is "generally accepted" in the scientific
community. 74 These factors indicate that the focus of this analysis is
on the scientific validity of the principles and methodology underlying
75
the expert's testimony.
Although Daubert resolved the confusion between Frye and
Rule 702 for scientific testimony, it remained unclear whether
Daubert also applied to testimony based on technical or other
specialized knowledge.7 6 The Supreme Court resolved this question in
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, which held that Daubert applies to
such testimony.77 The Court recognized that the five factors
articulated in Daubert may have little relevance to determining the
validity of non-scientific testimony; therefore, it suggested that the
admissibility of nonscientific expert testimony requires consideration
of factors specific to the area of expertise involved, as well as the use
78
of logic and common sense.
The Daubert opinion also was unclear as to whether it created
a more permissive standard than Frye, as suggested by much of the
Court's dicta, or a more exacting standard, as suggested by its charge
to trial judges to perform "gatekeeping" duties to ensure scientific
validity.7 9 The Court steered toward the more exacting standard in

71. Id. at 589. The court clarifies "reliability," indicating that it means "evidentiary
reliability-that is, trustworthiness." Id. at 590 n.9. Therefore, the Court concluded, in a case
involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability is based on scientific validity.
72. Id. at 591-92.
73. Id. at 592-93.
74. Id. at 593-94.
75. Id. at 594-95.
76. Id. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
78. Id.
79. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587-88 (noting that Rule 702's "basic standard of relevance...
is a liberal one" and that Frye's "rigid" general acceptance requirement is "at odds with the
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General Electric Co. v. Joiner, circumscribing the permissive language
of Daubert by asserting that the Federal Rules admit only "a
somewhat broader range of scientific testimony than would have been
admissible under Frye."80 The Court noted that the range is "broader
in that Daubert applies to testimony based on technical and other
specialized knowledge, not just purely scientific testimony."8 1 The
Court rejected a permissive interpretation of Daubert in Weisgram v.
Marley Co., stating that, since Daubert, "parties relying on expert
evidence have had notice of the exacting standards of reliability such
evidence must meet."8 2 Although Daubert initially appeared to chart a
permissive course for the admission of scientific testimony, its progeny
83
gradually moved toward a broader and stricter test than Frye.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho
Tire were codified in the 2000 amendment of Rule 702. The rule
currently reads:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and8 4(3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

Rule 702(1) requires an expert to consider all of the pertinent
evidence and alternative explanations to ensure that his conclusion is
sufficiently supported.8 5 The "principle" prong of Rule 702(2) requires
that the theory on which the expert bases his testimony is valid; this
prong must be satisfied whether the testimony is scientific, technical,
or based on experience.8 6 The "method" prong of Rule 702(2) requires
that the expert's theories are derived through reliable means; thus,
scientific evidence must be derived through the scientific method and
non-scientific evidence must be derived through common sense, logic,

'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules"). But see id. at 589 (emphasizing the importance of the
"gatekeeping" function in ensuring that scientific testimony "is not only relevant, but reliable").
80. 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997).
81. Id.
82.

528 U.S. 440, 442 (2000).

83. David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the General
Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 385, 386 (2001). Kumho Tire broadened the Daubert test
beyond Frye by applying it to technical and specialized knowledge, as well. At the same time,
later courts viewed Daubert as a more stringent test than Frye in that it required judges to apply
"exacting scrutiny."
84.

FED. R. EVID. 702.

85.

WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 54.

86.

Id.
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and practices common to the area of expertise in question.8 7 Finally,
Rule 702(3) requires experts to apply the valid principles and methods
88
reliably to the facts of the particular case.
Rule 702(2)'s inquiry into the principles and methods
underlying an expert's testimony provides the meat for a trial judge's
admissibility decision. Questions related to whether an expert
properly applied an established principle to the facts, or questions
related to an expert's bias, are matters that a jury is competent to
evaluate.8 9 The Daubert Court confirmed this role for the jury when it
asserted that "vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence." 90 Thus, the trial judge's role is to determine if the evidence,
such as offender profiling testimony, is admissible, which requires an
inquiry into whether the expert's testimony rests on valid principles
and methodology.
III. THE IMPERMISSIBLE ADMISSION OF OFFENDER PROFILING
Despite flaws in the fundamental logic underlying offender
profiling and the absence of any scientific study validating its
methodology, trial courts have admitted expert profiling testimony
routinely, and these decisions have been affirmed by some appellate
courts. Section A of this Part examines the validity of offender
profiling, as well as its general acceptance, and concludes that judges
should not admit this evidence as expert testimony under either Rule
702 or Frye. Section B discusses the different approaches adopted by
defendants and prosecutors who introduce expert offender profiling
testimony and surveys how courts have ruled on its admissibility.
Section C presents explanations for why offender profiling is admitted
as expert testimony despite its lack of evidentiary reliability.

87. Id. For instance, an expert testifying about polygraph results relies on a theory that
certain metabolic processes are affected when someone tells a lie, and that these changes can be
measured and interpreted accurately. A judge can evaluate this theory under the traditional
Daubert factors for scientific testimony to determine if it is valid. On the other hand, a police
officer testifying about the meaning of code words in a drug transaction-which qualifies as
specialized knowledge-relies on a theory that drug dealers use code words to disguise their true
intent. A judge can evaluate the validity of this theory using logic, common sense, and other
relevant considerations.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
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Willful Ignorance: The Theoretical and MethodologicalInvalidity
of Offender Profiling

Offender profiling has inspired a plethora of novels, movies,
and television programs. 91 But until recently, it inspired little
academic research; instead, most of the published literature on
offender profiling came from nonacademic sources such as FBI
bulletins, memoirs of the agents who started the BAU, and a few
articles published by FBI agents-usually coauthored with Ann
Burgess.9 2 Most of these sources reiterate the fundamental principles
on which offender profiling is based, as described in Subsection II.A.2
of this Note and summarized here: (1) offender behavior is consistent
across crime scenes, across time, and across non-criminal activities;
and (2) within each type of offender class, there are identifiable
subtypes of offenders. The validity of these principles has only
recently been studied, and the results suggest that these assumptions
3
are more complicated than the FBI profilers assert.9
A particular concern is that the majority of the assumptions,
typologies, and classifications regarding offender profiling that are
promulgated by the FBI rely on Douglas's and Ressler's interviews of
thirty-six prisoners (mostly serial killers), conducted using the
interview instrument created by Burgess. 94 This initial research
project, which Ressler characterized as an exploratory study, suffers
from serious methodological flaws. In particular, the project did not
use "a random, or even large, sample of all offenders," nor did it
"explore how they may be divided appropriately into subgroups";
instead, the FBI agents assumed from the beginning that certain
91.

Novels include: HERB CHAPMAN'S THE BOOK OF CAIN (2001); THOMAS HARRIS'S

HANNIBAL (1999), HANNIBAL RISING (2006), RED DRAGON (1981), and THE SILENCE OF THE

LAMBS (1988); ALEX KAVA'S AT THE STROKE OF MADNESS (2003), A NECESSARY EVIL (2006), A
PERFECT EVIL (2000), SOUL CATCHER (2002), and SPLIT SECOND (2001); and MARIAH STEWART'S
A DEAD END: A NOVEL (2005), just to name a few. Movies include: HANNIBAL (MGM 2001),
MANHUNTER (De Laurentiis Entertainment Group 1986), MINDHUNTERS (Dimension Films
2005), RED DRAGON (Universal Pictures 2002), SILENCE OF THE LAMBS (Orion Pictures Corp.
1991), TAKING LIVES (Warner Bros. Pictures 2004). Television programs include: Body of
Evidence: From the Case Files of Dayle Hinman (CourtTV television broadcast 2002-present),
Criminal Minds (CBS television broadcast 2005-present), and Profiler(NBC television broadcast
1996-2000).
92. For a discussion of Ann Burgess's affiliation with the BAU, see supra note 24.
93. See David Canter, Offender Profiling and Investigative Psychology, 1 J. INVESTIGATIVE
PSYCHOL. & OFFENDER PROFILING 1, 4-6 (2004) (discussing psychological studies that call into
question these fundamental assumptions).
94. David Canter et al., The Organized/DisorganizedTypology of Serial Murder: Myth or
Model?, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & LAw 293, 296 (2004) ("[Since the] initial limited sample of
thirty-six offenders, no subsequent test of the reliability [of the BAU's conclusions] can be found
in the academic literature."); see supra text accompanying note 23.
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behaviors and characteristics would discriminate between subgroups
of offenders and then simply categorized the offenders they
interviewed into subgroups based on these behaviors and
characteristics. 95 This circularity is a fundamental flaw in the FBI's
methodology. 96 As a result, the majority of the publications distributed
by the FBI, which are the primary basis for the entire practice of
offender profiling, are "based on an informal exploratory study of
thirty-six offenders put forward as exemplars, rather than a specific
test of a representative sample of a general population of serial
murderers." 97 Although FBI profilers have had extensive and
unparalleled access to all of the data needed to evaluate the
effectiveness of their method, either they have never made a
systematic and scientific attempt to do so, or they have never made
public the results of such an attempt.
Independent researchers such as David Canter and his
colleagues, however, recently have begun to examine and discredit
some of the FBI's foundational conclusions. The first FBI classification
lined up in the crosshairs of the scientific method was the distinction
between organized and disorganized offenders-"one of the most
widely cited classifications of violent, serial offenders." 9 Despite its
widespread adoption and application since the inception of offender
profiling, this subtype classification has been criticized only
occasionally and was never empirically tested. 99
In the first empirical test, Canter and his colleagues examined
whether serial killers could be categorized reliably as either organized
or disorganized based on features of their crime scenes. 10 0 The study
used a sample of 100 randomly selected crime scenes of 100 serial
killers in the United States, using the criteria listed in the Crime
Classification Manual to distinguish disorganized from organized
crime scenes. 10 1 After examining the data, the authors concluded that
"all serial killers are likely to exhibit some aspects that are organized
and some that are disorganized, but the differences between them are,

95. Id.
96. Id. Canter has also criticized the study's methodology for lacking a theoretical
foundation, failing to use the scientific method, and simply speculating about differences among
people. See id. for a discussion of these criticisms.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 293.
99. Id. at 296-97.
100. Id. at 302.
101. Id. at 302-04.
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more than likely, differences in the particular subset of disorganized
'0 2
variables that they exhibit.'
The data did not provide any support for the FBI's dichotomy.
The authors therefore concluded that the organized/disorganized
subtype "is certainly not widely recognized in the scientific community
as a psychometrically valid test of personality."' 0'3 These findings-the
product of the only scientific attempt to validate the FBI's profiling
methodology to date-severely undermine one of the cornerstones of
the FBI's methodology. Because this study is the only empirical
attempt to validate offender profiling, these results also suggest that
offender profiling is not generally accepted in the scientific
community.
In addition, members of the scientific community also criticize
the profilers' misrepresentation of established psychological theory, as
current psychological research
does not support profilers'
presumptions that traits are consistent across time and situations and
that different traits predictably relate to different personality types,
as well as the lack of any empirical support for their claims.1 0 4 While
profilers assert the validity of their method when they are offered as
expert witnesses, they admit elsewhere that "there have been no
systematic efforts to validate [the] profile-derived classifications"
described by the Crime Classification Manual.10 5 Moreover, Douglas
asserts in his memoirs that the "key attribute necessary to be a good
profiler is judgment-a judgment based not primarily on the analysis
of facts and figures, but on instinct."'0 6 If profilers themselves admit
that their technique is based primarily on subjective instincts, then
trial judges should be circumspect in admitting their expert witness
testimony.
Regardless whether profilers describe their technique as
scientific or nonscientific (e.g., based on specialized knowledge), judges
should not admit it as expert testimony. As a purported science, the
fundamental assumptions of offender profiling have no scientific
support, the scientific community has challenged its methodology,
denying its general acceptance, and peer reviewed journals fail to find
empirical support for the theory. As a non-scientific technique, FBI
profilers do not claim any validity or reliability for their method, and
some admit that offender profiling is based, at least in part, on

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 313.
Id. at 313, 315.
Id. at 296 (summarizing criticisms from several authorities).
DOUGLAS ET AL., supra note 17, at 22.
DOUGLAS & OLSHAKER, JOURNEY, supra note 38, at 31.
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"instinct," which seems to violate the common sense and logic required
to admit it as expert testimony. Therefore, expert testimony related to
offender profiling, whether considered as scientific testimony or other
specialized knowledge, should not be admissible in criminal trials
under either Rule 702 or Frye.
B. JudicialDecisions on the Admissibility of Offender
Profiling Testimony
His testimony was as old as Sherlock Holmes, and was properly admitted to help the
jury understand certain characteristics of the crime scene. 107

To determine whether courts admit or reject expert offender
profiling testimony, I examined published and unpublished appellate
decisions regarding the use of profiling testimony in criminal cases.
This research indicates that profiling testimony can appear in
different forms, not all of which rely on crime scene analysis. Thus,
this Note limits its in-depth analysis to offender profiling; that is, to
cases in which the prosecution or defense submitted profiling
testimony through an expert, and the expert relied on crime scene
analysis to generate the offender profile.10 8 Before analyzing offender
profiling cases, however, this Note will discuss briefly how courts treat
other forms of expert profiling testimony. This discussion is necessary
to highlight how courts' treatment of offender profiling testimony is
exceptional compared to other forms of profiling testimony.
Expert profiling testimony that is not based on crime scene
analysis generally is not permitted in criminal trials. For example,
appellate courts consistently reject profiling testimony as to whether a
defendant matches a general profile describing a certain type of sex
offender.1 09 Appellate courts also reject attempts to use profiling
107. People v. Duvardo, No. A098935, 2004 WL 2458585, at *16 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2004)
(affirming trial court's admission of offender profiling testimony).
108. Because not all cases report the expert's methodology, this Note includes cases in which
the expert used the jargon of offender profiling (e.g., by describing a crime scene as organized or
disorganized). This Note's criteria excludes cases in which law enforcement used a profile as a
basis for probable cause (e.g., drug courier profiles), an expert described a general profile that
was not developed by analyzing the crime scene (e.g., most sex offender profiles), or an expert in
crime scene analysis opined on an offender's future dangerousness.
109. Jurisdictions that have rejected sex offender profiling offered by the prosecution include:
the Ninth Circuit, the U.S. Court of Military Appeals, and Massachusetts. See, e.g., United
States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475, 479-80 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Banks, 36 M.J. 150,
152 (C.M.A. 1992); Commonwealth v. Poitras, 774 N.E.2d 647, 651 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).
Jurisdictions that have rejected sex offender profiling offered by the defendant include: the
Eighth Circuit, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New York, Tennessee, and Texas. See, e.g., United States v. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417,
420 (8th Cir. 1987); State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 124 (1989), aff'd, 568 A.2d 796 (1990);
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testimony to match defendants to general profiles of other types of
offenders. 110
Although courts consistently reject expert testimony that
compares the defendant to a general profile, the cases identified for
this Note indicate that trial courts routinely permit expert offcnder
profiling testimony that compares the defendant to a profile developed
from analysis of the crime scene, and appellate courts occasionally
affirm these decisions.1 11 Moreover, the appellate decisions suggest an
interesting observation: expert offender profiling testimony may be
offered more frequently by the prosecution than by the defense and its
admission is more frequently permitted by the appellate court for the
11 2
prosecution.
Several explanations may account for this observation. One
explanation is that this result has nothing to do with offender
profiling per se, but is instead an artifact of a broader pattern-judges
in criminal trials routinely admit expert testimony offered by the
113
prosecution and exclude expert testimony offered by the defense.
Moreover, the greater prevalence of appellate decisions related to
prosecution attempts to admit offender profiling testimony may be
evidence that experts in offender profiling are less accessible for
Gilstrap v. State, 215 Ga. App. 180, 181 (1994); State v. Hulbert, 481 N.W.2d 329, 334 (Iowa
1992); Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 685 S.W.2d 549, 554 (Ky. 1985); State v. Armstrong, 587 So.
2d 168, 170 (La. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Fitzgerald, 382 N.W.2d 892, 896 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986);
State v. Elbert, 831 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Cavaliere, 140 N.H. 108, 114
(1995); People v. Berrios, 568 N.Y.S.2d 512, 515 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991); State v. Campbell, 904
S.W.2d 608, 616 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); Williams v. State, 649 S.W.2d 693, 695-96 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1983).
110. See, e.g., Brunson v. State, 79 S.W.3d 304, 305 (Ark. 2002) (reversing trial court's
admission of testimony from domestic violence expert that placed defendant in a profile of
batterers who become murderers); Penson v. State, 474 S.E.2d 104, 106 (Ga. App. 1996)
(reversing the trial court's decision to admit expert testimony describing an FBI serial arsonist
profile); Commonwealth v. Day, 569 N.E.2d 397, 400 (Mass. 1991) (reversing trial court's
admission of child abuse expert's testimony about family characteristics that are related to child
abuse); Kaps v. State, No. 05-97-00328-CR, 1998 WL 209060, at *8 (Tex. App. 1998) (affirming
trial court's refusal to admit expert testimony that defendant did not fit the profile of a typical
abusive man); Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 56 (Wyo. 1999) (reversing trial court's admission of
testimony from an expert in battered woman syndrome indicating that the defendant matched
the profile of offenders who commit separation violence).
111. See infra Subsections III.B.1-2.
112. Appellate courts affirmed trial court decisions to exclude expert testimony on offender
profiling introduced by the defense in the decisions identified by this author. With respect to
expert testimony on offender profiling introduced by the prosecution, ten of eleven trial courts
permitted the testimony, and only three of those ten were reversed by the appellate court. See
infra Subsections III.B.1-2, III.C, for discussion and citation to all of these cases.
113. D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of
Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 99, 109-10 (2000) (indicating that 92% of
prosecution experts in federal criminal trials survive challenges from opposing counsel,
compared to only 33% of defense experts).
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defendants, or that criminal defendants are more likely than
prosecutors to appeal trial court decisions. Alternatively, this
discrepancy may relate to the manner in which and purposes for
which the testimony is presented by each party-suggesting that
prosecutors' strategies are not only more effective than those of
defendants, but also are not generally available to defendants. The
remainder of this Section explores this final explanation by analyzing
judicial decisions that have considered expert profiling testimony
proffered by defendants and prosecutors.
Borrowing from the Holmes quotation found in the
Introduction, 114 the primary difference between the strategies of
prosecutors and defendants, and the resulting difference in their
effectiveness, is that unsuccessful defense attorneys resort to blunt
assertions that a defendant does not fit a profile, while successful
prosecutors produce well staged performances-using a subtle
inference that allows the jury to conclude on its own that the
defendant fits a profile.1 1 5 A prosecutor's expert educates the jury
about crime scene classification, including behavioral characteristics
such as organization and disorganization, and discusses how these
features relate to an offender's motivation, personality, and general
behavior. The prosecutor then submits evidence about the defendant
that reflects the characteristics described by the profilers, thus
inviting the jury to conclude that the defendant meets the profile of a
typical offender. For example, drawing from Douglas's profile of the
trail-side killer described in the Introduction, the profiler might testify
in court that, based on the crime scene evidence, the offender who
committed this type of murder is likely to have a disability, such as a
speech impediment. Later, when the jury learns of the defendant's
stutter, it is invited to conclude that the defendant must be a
murderer, even though millions of people who stutter never murder.
Some trial and appellate courts have detected and exposed this clever
ruse, but others have either fallen into the same trap as the jury or
1 16
have opted to ignore its implications.
This Section analyzes courts' treatment of offender profiling
testimony. Subsection 1 addresses defense attempts to introduce
expert testimony on profiling, and discusses several representative
cases and each court's reasoning. Subsection 2 examines prosecution
attempts to introduce expert testimony on offender profiling, and
appellate courts' responses.
114. See supratext accompanying note 1.
115. See infra Subsections III.B.1-2.
116. For a discussion of these decisions, see infra Subsection III.B.2.

2008]

OFFENDERPROFILING
1. Failed Attempts by Defendants to Proffer Expert
Profiling Testimony

Both trial and appellate courts rejected expert offender
profiling testimony introduced by the defendant in two of the three
cases identified in this Note. 117 In State v. Fain, the Idaho Supreme
Court affirmed a trial court's refusal to allow the defendant to
introduce a psychological profile of the perpetrator that he did not fit,
which was prepared by the FBI during their investigation of the
crime. 118 The court reasoned that "[a] profile, of course, is not a
physical scientific test conducted upon actual evidence using wellestablished scientific principles."' 1 9 In dicta, the court also noted that
the profile "would not have been relevant evidence as to the issue of
120
the identity of the perpetrator of the crimes charged."'
Similarly, in State v. Stevens, the Supreme Court of Tennessee
affirmed a trial court's decision to exclude the testimony of a former
FBI profiler regarding a murderer's motive. 12' The defendant was
accused of hiring an associate to kill his wife and mother-in-law and
sought to qualify the erstwhile FBI profiler as an expert to testify that
the crime scene was a "disorganized sexual homicide."'122 Invoking the
Daubert trilogy, the court reasoned that exclusion of the testimony
was appropriate because "this type of crime scene analysis, developed
by the FBI as a means of criminal investigation, relies on the expert's
subjective judgment to draw conclusions as to the type of individual
who committed this crime."1 23 In addition, the court reasoned that an
individual's guilt or innocence cannot be determined by "opinion
evidence connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the
expert."'124 The failed attempts to proffer expert offender profiling
testimony in Fain and Stevens are the only appellate decisions
identified in which appellate courts discussed the admissibility of
25
defendants' use of this testimony.
117. In the third case, People v. Tuite, No. D044943, 2006 WL 3628819, at *8-9 (Cal. Ct. App.
Dec. 14, 2006), discussed infra Section III.C, the trial court permitted the defendant to introduce
expert offender profiling testimony, but the prosecution did not contest its admissibility.
118. 774 P.2d 252, 257 (Idaho 1989).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 78 S.W.3d 817, 823, 836 (Tenn. 2002).
122. Id. at 823, 830.
123. Id. at 835.
124. Id. (quoting General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)).
125. A fourth case discusses offender profiling testimony offered by a defendant, but does not
rule on its admissibility. In State v. Spann, 513 S.E.2d 98 (S.C. 1999), the Supreme Court of
South Carolina reversed a trial court's decision to reject a motion for a new trial by a defendant
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2. Mixed Results for Prosecutors Who Proffer Expert
Profiling Testimony
In contrast to defendants, prosecutors have successfully
proffered expert offender profiling testimony at the trial court level
and have had mixed, as opposed to no, success at the appellate level.
In particular, trial courts admitted offender profiling testimony
offered by the prosecution in ten of eleven decisions identified for this
Note, and appellate courts affirmed seven of the ten decisions to admit
the testimony. The following discussion first describes a case that
exposes how a prosecutor can present profiling testimony indirectly
without asserting outright that a defendant fits the profile, which
improperly invites the jury to conclude that a defendant is a certain
type of offender. It then examines cases in which appellate courts
failed to reject expert offender profiling testimony that relied on this
improper inference.
In People v. Robbie, the defendant was convicted of kidnapping
a sixteen-year-old girl for sexual purposes, oral copulation, and
penetration with a foreign object. 126 According to the prosecution's
witnesses, the defendant kidnapped the victim, took her to a remote
hill where he threatened her with a knife and forced her to perform
oral sex, and then drove her home, acting in a friendly manner and
asking her about her school and work. The defendant did not contest
that he had a sexual encounter with the Victim, but asserted that she
approached him seeking to purchase methamphetamine, and the
sexual acts were payment for the drugs. The prosecution proffered a
member of the California Department of Justice to testify that the
defendant's conduct, particularly the friendly banter after the criminal
act, was consistent with a certain type of rapist. The expert testified
that she supervised the Violent Crime Profiling Unit, spending half of
her time creating offender profiles for unsolved cases and half
evaluating known offenders and attempting to link them to unsolved
convicted of sexual assault, murder, and burglary and sentenced to death. At the new trial
hearing, the defendant presented the testimony of a crime scene analyst asserting that the
perpetrator of the murder for which the defendant was convicted was responsible for two similar
murders, and that the profile of the perpetrator did not match that of the defendant. The trial
court denied the motion, holding that this evidence was available at the time of the defendant's
original trial eighteen years earlier. The South Carolina Supreme Court ordered the new trial on
the basis that the similarities between the crime scenes, which suggested they were committed
by the same perpetrator, could not have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence. Id. at
621-22. After pleading a reduced sentence from the death penalty to a life sentence, the
defendant was paroled in 2006. For a complete description of this case, see Keith Morrison, A 20Year Quest for Freedom, MSNBC.CoM, June 11, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19161103/.
126. For the relevant facts of this case, see 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 479, 479-83 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001).
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crimes. Her expertise was based on more than a dozen years of
experience, law enforcement courses, review of research material, and
consultation with other analysts. The trial court permitted her
testimony "to show that certain conduct of the type engaged in by
defendant in this case was or is consistent with the conduct of a person
who has committed the kinds of sexual crimes alleged here."
The First District Court of Appeal of California reversed the
trial court's decision to permit the testimony of the prosecution's
expert witness. 127 The court rejected her testimony principally because
she opined that certain hypothetical conduct-friendly banter with the
victim, which happened to be the exact conduct attributed to the
defendant-was the most prevalent type of post-offense behavior
displayed by sex offenders. 128 The court emphasized that this form of
profile testimony is inherently prejudicial because it invites a flawed
syllogism: "[C]riminals act in a certain way; the defendant acted that
way; therefore, the defendant is a criminal." 129 The flaw in the
syllogism is that it implies that innocent individuals never could act in
the same manner, even though certain behavior-here, friendly
banter-is consistent with both legal and illegal conduct. 130 The court
held that the admission of this testimony was reversible error because
the "jury was invited to conclude that if defendant engaged in the
conduct described," then "he was indeed a sex offender." 131 Although
the court did not apply any admissibility standard explicitly, its
exclusion based on logic and common sense is consistent with the
inquiry required by Daubert and Kumho Tire. Several appellate courts
have either recognized this flawed syllogism or properly rejected the
1 32
testimony as unreliable and unscientific.

127. Id. at 488.
128. Id. at 482, 486.
129. Id. at 485.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 486. The court suggested that the expert testimony would have been permitted if
it was proffered to disabuse the jury of common misconceptions about how rape is committed.
Rather than testifying that certain behaviors are typical of sex offenders, the expert could have
testified that rapists exhibit a variety of behaviors and that there is no typical sex offender. Id. at
487.
132. See State v. Garcia, No. 79917, 2002 WL 1874535, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2002)
(holding that trial court's admission of crime scene analyst's testimony that an arson was
committed for profit was harmless error, and reasoning that the testimony invaded the province
of the jury without addressing its admissibility under Ohio's version of Rule 702); State v.
Roquemore, 620 N.E.2d 110, 116-17 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (reversing trial court's decision to
admit offender profiling testimony, asserting that the crime was "disorganized" and indicated an
anger-retaliatory motivation because it is inherently prejudicial and the witness based his
opinion "on his own 'studies' rather than upon an accepted scientific basis"); State v. Haynes, No.
4310, 1988 WL 99189, at *2-7 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 21, 1988) (reversing trial court's admission of
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For example, in State v. Lowe, the Court of Appeals of Ohio
affirmed a trial court's decision to exclude Douglas's testimony that a
homicide was sexually motivated and that the defendant's writings
were "sexually motivated and represented the defendant's plan or
mission for power." 133 In rejecting Douglas's testimony, the court
reasoned that "the purported scientific analytical processes to which
Douglas testified are based on intuitiveness honed by his considerable
experience in the field of homicide investigation," and that "sufficient
evidence of reliability [was not] adduced to demonstrate the relevancy
of the testimony or to qualify Douglas as an expert witness. '134 Lowe is
the only case identified for this Note in which the prosecution
appealed a trial court's decision to reject expert offender profiling
testimony.
Although a few appellate courts have reversed trial court
decisions to permit prosecutors' expert offender profiling testimony,
most appellate courts have affirmed. In United States v. Meeks, a
military court-martial convicted the defendant of the grisly murders of
two of his acquaintances. 135 The prosecution submitted Judson Ray,
an FBI profiler, as an expert witness to offer his opinion "concerning
certain generic characteristics of the perpetrator derived from
evidence at the crime scene." 136 The prosecution indicated that Ray's
proposed testimony would be limited to explaining that the crime
scene was organized and that the crime likely was committed by a
single offender who knew the area and the victims. 137 He would
further assert that it was a personal crime, that the offender
committed it with controlled rage, and that the offender directed his
anger and emotion at the victims. 138 The trial judge admitted the
testimony, but prohibited Ray from describing physical characteristics
of the suspected offender, such as age, and instructed that the
testimony be limited to the analysis of the physical aspects of the
crime scene.1 39 Ray proceeded to testify in the manner summarized by
the prosecution, also indicating that the offender went to the crime

expert offender profiling testimony-presented by the same expert that testified in Roquemorebecause it is inherently prejudicial to the defendant and the State did not establish that it is
scientifically reliable or would assist the jury).
133. 599 N.E.2d 783, 784-85 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
134. Id. at 785.
135. 35 M.J. 64, 65 (C.M.A.1992).
136. Id. at 69.
137. Id. at 65-66.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 66.
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scene "with sex and killing on his mind" and that the offender was
140
known by the victims "because he ha[d] a right to be there."
The United States Court of Military Appeals affirmed the trial
court's admission of Ray's testimony. Applying the Military Rule of
Evidence 702, which was identical to the 1975 version of Rule 702, the
court reasoned that Ray's crime scene analysis was based on scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge, and it was not pure
speculation, as the defense asserted. In support of this conclusion, the
court cited the trial judge's inquiry into the basis of Ray's testimony,
which had elicited the following response from the prosecution:
It's based on statistics, personal interviews... The [National Center for the Analysis of
Violent Crime] itself has been studying these types of crimes for over ten years; they
have interviewed all types of criminals; they examine the crime scene; they find out why
criminals do certain things; and they are able to zero in on what counts. Using
are able to determine the common
statistical analysis, computer analysis, they
41
denominators and what those items mean. 1

Based on this assertion, the trial judge concluded that the
"showing of expertise can hardly be considered speculation."'142 The
appellate court also noted that crime scene analysis, "the gathering
and analysis of physical evidence, is generally recognized as a body of
143
specialized knowledge."
Curiously, the Meeks court failed to acknowledge that much of
Ray's testimony related to psychological characteristics of the
offender, not physical aspects of the crime scene. 144 In addition, the
court accepted at face value that the FBI had developed a statistical
and scientific method of isolating distinct psychological motivations
based purely on physical evidence, which, as discussed above, is not
supported by any currently accepted scientific theory or empirical
data--or even by FBI profilers themselves, who describe the process
as "intuitive," not scientific. The court simply accepted the validity of
the expert's method based on the ipse dixit of the prosecutor.
Similarly, in Masters v. People, the defendant was convicted of
murdering a woman whose body was found several hundred feet from
his home.' 45 After the body was discovered, investigators searched the
defendant's home and conducted multiple interviews, which revealed

140. Id. at 66-67.
141. Id. at 67. The BAU is a division of the National Center for the Analysis of Violent
Crime.
142. Id. at 68.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 66-67 ("[T]he perpetrator in the instant case was 'an organized individual, an
individual that had planned and spent some time in the preparation of this crime.' ").
145. 58 P.3d 979, 983 (Colo. 2002).
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substantial circumstantial evidence, but no direct evidence, linking
the defendant to the crime. 146 Several years later, a forensic
psychologist, Dr. Reid Meloy, examined the evidence and prepared a
report that implicated the defendant as the offender. 147 The defense
sought to prevent the admission of Dr. Meloy's testimony on the
grounds that it was improper character evidence. 148 The prosecution
asserted that Dr. Meloy's testimony did not relate to the defendant's
character, but was "relevant to prove the identity of the perpetrator,
the motivation and premeditation of the defendant, the defendant's
planning of the crime, his opportunity to commit the crime, and his
149
subsequent knowledge of the crime."
At a pretrial hearing, Dr. Meloy testified that he had expertise
in sexual homicide; that sexual homicides are either organized,
disorganized, or mixed; and that this crime was a disorganized sexual
homicide with some organized features. Dr. Meloy also testified that
fantasy can serve as the primary motivation for sexual homicide and
that the defendant's writings reflected his fantasies. 150 The trial judge
ultimately permitted Dr. Meloy to discuss "sexual homicide and
identify the characteristics of the murder that were consistent
therewith," to explain the relevance of fantasy and identify examples
of the defendant's written productions that met the definition of
fantasy, and to describe the types of events that might trigger a sexual
homicide. 151 However, the court prohibited Dr. Meloy from opining
that the defendant committed the crime or that he fit the profile of a
153
sexual homicide offender. 152 Largely based on Dr. Meloy's testimony,
the defendant was convicted of first degree murder. The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. Meloy's
testimony.154 The court based its analysis on Colorado Rule of

146. Id. at 985. The circumstantial evidence included hundreds of writings and drawings
conveying a hatred of women, some of which accurately depicted aspects of the crime scene, an
admission from the defendant that he had thought about committing the kind of crime that had
occurred, and the defendant's possession of specialized weapons that were necessary to commit
the crime. Id. at 983-84.
147. Id. at 985.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 985-87.
151. Id. at 987, 992.
152. Id. at 987.
153. Id. at 985.
154. Id. at 988.
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Evidence 702, which is identical to the 1975 version of Rule 702.155 In
particular, the court focused on whether the principles underlying Dr.
Meloy's testimony were reasonably reliable. 156 The court found that
the prosecution had established that Dr. Meloy's testimony was
generally accepted in the forensic community, that an extensive body
of specialized literature about sexual homicide exists, and that the
research systematically compares groups of sexual homicide
perpetrators to control groups. 15 7 The court also dismissed the claim
that Dr. Meloy's testimony constituted impermissible profile
evidence. 158 In previous cases, the court had rejected the use of profile
testimony based on the "subjective, if not intuitive" judgment of the
expert, which also described behaviors and characteristics that could
apply equally to law-abiding citizens. 159 Applying these standards to
Dr. Meloy's testimony, the court concluded that it was far from the
"subjective, if not intuitive" judgment of experts in previous cases;
instead, "Dr. Meloy relied on an objective, widely-recognized
psychological theory, one which was founded on research and study,
and one which the trial court determined was generally recognized
within the forensic community."' 60 In reaching this conclusion, the
court rejected the assertions of the defense's expert, who argued that
the prosecution expert's theories were not generally accepted because
they had not been validated, the research was new, sample sizes were
161
small, and the studies failed to use control groups.
The Supreme Court of Colorado's decision in Masters is
bothersome for many reasons. At a logical level, setting aside for now
the validity of the science behind Dr. Meloy's testimony, the court
walked directly into the flawed syllogism exposed by the Robbie court.
The court plainly endorsed the proposition that profiling testimony
can describe how certain criminals behave, that it can establish that
innocent individuals never behave in the same manner, that a
prosecutor can present evidence of the defendant's behavior, and that
the jury can conclude that the defendant is a criminal because he
behaved in conformity with the profile. Turning to the scientific
validity of profiling, the court's decision that Dr. Meloy's method of
offender profiling was valid and objective, despite the complete lack of
any scientific validation and the claims of FBI agents that it is not
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 988-89.
at 989.
at 993.
(citing Salcedo v. People, 999 P.2d 833, 838 (Colo. 2000)).
at 993-94.
at 1010 (Bender, J., dissenting).
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objective and is in fact "intuitive," is cause for concern. 162 For the court
to reach this conclusion, given the survey of the existing science
presented in Section III.A., either the trial judge failed to evaluate
critically Dr. Meloy's substantiation of his testimony, or Dr. Meloy
wholly misrepresented the science behind his techniques. 163 Several
other appellate courts also have affirmed trial court decisions to admit
1
expert offender profiling testimony. 64

162. Id. at 993-94. Dr. Meloy was almost certainly applying the methodology developed by
the BAU, or a technique inspired by it, because he used terminology such as "organized" and
"disorganized," jargon which is unique to the BAU technique.
163. On January 22, 2008, a Colorado judge released Timothy Masters from prison based on
new DNA evidence indicating that someone else committed the crime. Eliott C. McLaughlin,
Masters: Cop's Big Ego Stole Half My Life, CNN, Jan. 24, 2008, http://www.cnn.com
/2008/CRIME/O1/23/masters.case/. A few days later, prosecutors asked a judge to dismiss the
murder charge pending against Masters. See Eliott C. McLaughlin, D.A.: Dismiss Murder
Charge Against Tim Masters, CNN, Jan. 25, 2008, http://www.cnn.coni2008/CRIME
/O1/25/masters.charges/index.html. The vacated conviction and dropped charges followed an
inquiry by special prosecutors, which revealed that statements of a renowned FBI profiler
disagreeing with Dr. Meloy's findings were withheld from defense attorneys. See Eliott C.
McLaughlin, Convicted by Doodles, Masters if Freed by DNA, CNN, Jan. 25, 2008,
http://www.cnn.cod2008/CRIME/01/22/masters.case/index.html. The new evidence also suggests
that the FBI profile on which Dr. Meloy based his testimony either never existed or was a
fraudulent profile created with the purpose of flushing out Masters. See Letter from Maria Liu
and David Wymore, Att'ys for Timothy Masters, to Michael Goodbee, Assistant Dist. Att'y, and
Chief Deputy Dist. Att'y, Tom Quammen, (Oct. 23, 2007), http://i.a.cnn.netcnn/2008/
images/01/16/letter.pdf. This case illustrates that admitting expert offender profiling testimony
can result in wrongful convictions, especially when it is the primary evidence for the
prosecution's case. Moreover, this case also suggests that defense attorneys may face significant
obstacles to obtaining favorable expert offender profiling evidence.
164. In Toney v. State, No. 01-94-00239-CR, 1996 WL 183411, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 18,
1996), the court held that the failure of defendant's counsel to object to offender profiling
testimony did not render counsel ineffective because the expert never concluded that the
defendant matched the profile, even though the defendant did match in many respects. Toney is
also noteworthy because both the trial and the appellate court appeared to accept the offender
profiler's testimony that in her "career of sixteen years in police work, [she has] found that
profiling is truly a science." Id. at *2. In Simmons v. State, 797 So.2d 1134, 1158 (Ala. Crim. App.
1999), the Alabama Appeals Court affirmed the trial court's admission of offender profiling
testimony to establish that a murder was sexually motivated. Applying Daubert and Kumho
Tire, the court determined that offender profiling is reliable as specialized knowledge because
the expert testified that "research has been published within the field and subjected to peer
review." Simmons, 797 So. 2d at 1155. Furthermore, the court found that offender profiling is
generally accepted because the expert testified that "numerous law enforcement agencies rel[y]
upon crime-scene analysis." Id. Both the Toney and Simmons courts apparently accepted the
experts' bare assertions that offender profiling is a science, rather than conducting an actual
inquiry into the question. See also People v. Duvardo, No. A098935, 2004 WL 2458585, at *15-16
(Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2004) (affirming the trial court's admission of offender profiling testimony,
and accepting expert's testimony that it was not a "fledging scientific technique," it was not "junk
science," and it was as "old as Sherlock Holmes"); State v. Patton, 120 P.3d 760, 785 (Kan. 2005)
(affirming trial court's admission of offender profiling testimony because it represented pure
opinion testimony and was not subject to the requirements of Frye); State v. Carlson, Nos. 304350-II, 30435-0-II, 2006 WL 1237279, at *25 (Wash. Ct. App. May 10, 2006) (affirming trial court's
admission of offender profiling testimony under the Frye standard).

2008]

OFFENDERPROFILING

C. Explanationsfor Decisions to Admit Expert Offender Profiling
Testimony
Many factors explain why prosecutors' expert offender profiling
testimony is admitted in criminal trials routinely despite its lack of
scientific validity. One factor is the self-validating character of
offender profiling-because law enforcement developed it to identify
and convict criminals, experts in the field have no incentive to validate
its principles and methodology scientifically. Thus, experts may
present offender profiling as a non-scientific technique (deflecting
questions regarding its scientific acceptance and whether it is
supported in peer-reviewed literature), even though it is based on
scientific claims and is subject to scientific verification. 165 Another
factor is that defense attorneys may face many obstacles in rebutting
prosecutors' expert offender profiling testimony. Finally, the
increasing prevalence of offender profiling in the popular media may
cause judges and juries to assign unwarranted credibility to the
technique.
In his dissent in Daubert, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed
his concern that trial judges now held "either the obligation or the
authority to become amateur scientists in order to perform" their
gatekeeping role. 166 Professor Nance, echoing Rehnquist's concern, has
argued that judges have difficulty in deferring to non-legal concepts of
reliability (such as scientific validity) rather than assessing reliability
based on legal standards. 167 But Rehnquist's concerns remain largely
unattended in the context of criminal prosecutions, as judges do not
appear to strictly scrutinize prosecution experts' qualifications,
methodology, and application of their methods to the facts. 168 A review
165. See Risinger & Loop, supra note 9, at 251 (arguing that the FBI has the data to confirm
or disconfirm its claims regarding linkage analysis, and it should not benefit from its "own
failure to aid the generation of defensible data").
166. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 601 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
167. Dale A. Nance, Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 191,
208 (2003).
168. See Henry F. Fradella et al., The Impact of Daubert on the Admissibility of Behavioral
Science Testimony, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 403, 444 (2003) ('There appears to be only one area in which
Daubert is not being rigorously applied to behavioral science testimony. Courts are highly
deferential to the 'expert opinions' offered by law enforcement officers based on their years of
experience in the field when they offer opinions with regard to modus operandi or other aspects
of 'the working criminal mind.' Explorations into their theoretical knowledge base, as well as the
validity and reliability of both their methodologies and their conclusions, appear to have escaped
Daubert review." (citations omitted)); Joelle A. Moreno, What Happens When Dirty Harry
Becomes an (Expert) Witness for the Prosecution?,79 TUL. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2004) (evaluating postDaubertcase law).
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of federal criminal court cases supports this conclusion, revealing that
ninety-two percent of prosecution experts survive defense challenges,
169
compared to only thirty-three percent of defense experts.
Judges' lack of scrutiny is particularly problematic when it
occurs in the context of expert testimony related to a self-validating
discipline. 170 This is a problem inherent in offender profiling because
the only practitioners are current or former FBI agents, or others
trained or influenced by the FBI.171 As a result, if a judge inquires into
the extent of peer-reviewed research related to offender profiling,
these practitioners are likely to respond by citing their experience and
the self-validating studies produced by the FBI to support their
technique, rather than the scientific research discussed above-of
which most practitioners likely are unaware-that undermines much
of their technique. 72 Some scholars have addressed this problem by
suggesting that "an opponent of self-validating evidence could
establish that the field of expertise itself lacks adequate indicia of
reliability (e.g.,
norms, standards, data
collection, testing
mechanisms)." 17 3 However, defense attorneys (as the typical
opponents) encounter significant obstacles in establishing that
offender profiling lacks these indicia of reliability.
An initial obstacle occurs when judges refuse to scrutinize
expert testimony as amateur scientists, which shifts the responsibility
to become amateur scientists to defense attorneys. A defense attorney
may attempt to establish through cross-examination that the field of
offender profiling lacks these indicia of reliability, but this is a
daunting challenge that likely exceeds the resources, time, and
training of most defense attorneys. As a result, a defense attorney
may be more likely to submit her own expert in offender profiling to
challenge the conclusions reached by the prosecution's expert. As soon
as she resorts to this measure, however, she abandons the argument
against the admissibility of offender profiling and instead shifts the
focus to the weight of competing experts' testimony.

169. Risinger, supra note 113.
170. See Nance, supra note 167, at 207 (suggesting that deference to non-scientific expertise
is inappropriate due to the lack of checks on this discipline).
171. For example, the state investigator in Robbie, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 479, 482-83 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001), and the forensic psychologist in Masters, 58 P.3d 979, 985-87 (Colo. 2002), both
described crime scene analysis using the FBI's organized/disorganized jargon, thus indicating the
FBI's influence on their training.
172. For examples of experts citing the self-validating studies or asserting the veracity of
offender profiling, see the discussion of Toney and Simmons, supra note 164.
173. Moreno, supra note 168, at 32.
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Introducing a defense expert in offender profiling may present
additional challenges resulting from the status of offender profiling as
a self-validated law enforcement technique. In particular, many
current or former FBI and law enforcement agents may not be
inclined to testify on behalf of defendants accused of violent crimes.
Even if such agents are willing in principle to testify for defendants,
practical pressures may prevent some from ultimately testifying. For
example, in People v. Tuite, police arrested a transient named Richard
Tuite for the murder of a twelve-year-old girl after his behavior
following her murder aroused suspicion. 174 On the evening of the girl's
death and during the following morning, Tuite had roamed around her
neighborhood behaving strangely and repeatedly knocking on doors
and looking into windows asking for someone named Tracy. 175 As part
of Tuite's defense, Special Agent Mary Ellen O'Toole of the BAU
testified that the crime scene was organized, the victim was targeted,
and that the crime probably was committed by multiple
perpetrators.1 76 This testimony supported the defense theory that the
murder was committed by the victim's brother and his friends and
challenged the prosecution's theory that Tuite wandered into the girl's
house and randomly attacked her.1 77 As a rebuttal expert, the
prosecution submitted retired FBI agent Gregg McCrary to attack
O'Toole's crime scene reconstruction.17 8 McCrary concluded that the
crime scene was more disorganized than organized, supporting the
prosecution's theory. 179 Tuite was convicted by a jury of voluntary
manslaughter. l80
On appeal, Tuite argued that the trial court erred by
precluding his defense counsel from cross-examining McCrary about
his attempt to prevent O'Toole from testifying.1 8 1 At issue was a letter
McCrary sent to the International Criminal Investigative Analysts

174. No. D044943, 2006 WL 3628819, at *2-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2006).
175. Id. Tracy and Tuite were friends ten years before the girl's death.
176. Id. at *8-9. O'Toole based her conclusions on a variety of factors. She testified that the
victim was targeted "because (1) of six people in the house, only she was attacked; (2) the
attacker had to pass other rooms to reach her bedroom; (3) there was no evidence of sexual
assault or theft;" and (4) her injuries were stab wounds all located above her chest. Id. at *8.
177. Id. at *1.
178. Id. at *9.
179. Id.
180. Id. at *1. The prosecution's primary evidence was samples of blood taken from Tuite's tshirt that matched the victim's DNA, but there were indications that cross-contamination could
have occurred between Tuite's belongings and officers who investigated the crime scene.
181. Id. at *16.
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Fellowship ("ICIAF') charging O'Toole with ethical violations.18 2 In his
letter, McCrary asserted that O'Toole's defense testimony was an
"attempt to obstruct justice and undermine the successful prosecution
of... the true killer," which "damage[d] the relationship between the
FBI, the ICIAF, and law enforcement agencies."'1 3 Despite asserting
that investigators
linked Tuite
to the
murder
through
"incontrovertible physical, forensic and circumstantial evidence,"
McCrary concluded by urging O'Toole not to testify, as her testimony
is "an unnecessary obstacle to what is already a complicated and
difficult prosecution."'' 8 4 The appellate court held that Tuite's defense
counsel should have been allowed to impeach McCrary with his letter,
but that the exclusion of the letter was harmless error. 8 5 McCrary's
letter suggests that there is strong pressure from the offender
profiling community against providing defense testimony, which may
86
limit defense attorneys' access to expert witnesses of their own.1
Not only is offender profiling subject to self-validation, but its
increasing popularity in novels, films, and television programs
suggests that judges, juries, and even law enforcement may attribute
extra credibility to the technique. 8 7 Canter and his colleagues
describe this process as the "Hollywood effect," which occurs when
"loosely formulated and often unsubstantiated theories and models are
featured in widely disseminated movies and given extra credibility"
through mainstream broadcast.' 8 8 Another result of this phenomenon
is that offender profiling may be incorporated into practice casually
and applied less systematically than some of the FBI profilers
originally intended, 8 9 but it nonetheless will continue to carry
significant persuasive authority. 90 Evidence of this effect can be

182. Id.; see also Katherine Ramsland, Interview with Gregg 0. McCrary-Violent Crimes
Expert, available at http://www.crimelibrary.con/criminal-mind/profiling/mccrary/3.html
(last
visited Dec. 27, 2007) (describing the ICIAF as an organization created by a group of FBI-trained
profilers who conduct training sessions, establish standards, and certify profilers).
183. Tuite, 2006 WL 3628819, at *16.
184. Id.

185. Id. at *19.
186. See Interview with Gregg McCrary, Defense Expert Witness, State v. Parker (Gct. 27,
1998), available at http://www.corpus-delicti.com/McCrary-parker102798.htm (indicating that
many current and former FBI-trained profilers have "harshly derided others in the profiling
community for performing defense casework").
187. Canter et al., supra note 94, at 295.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Donald Q. Cochran, Alabama v. Clarence Simmons: FBI "Profiler"Testimony to
Establish an Essential Element of Capital Murder, 23 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 69, 89 (1999)
("Because of the status of the FBI's Profiling and Behavioral Assessment Unit as the only
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drawn from the Robbie and Masters cases, which involved offender
profiling testimony offered by a local investigator and a forensic
psychologist,
respectively,
who
may
have
misrepresented
(intentionally or unintentionally) the scientific support for the FBI's
technique. 191
Additional support for the increasing dissemination, dilution,
and exaggeration of the capabilities of offender profiling comes from
Gregg McCrary, who commented in an interview that a major issue
"with profiling now is professionalism. Anyone can raise his hand and
declare himself a 'profiler.' This discipline is in its embryonic stages
and perhaps it's a bit like medicine was in the Wild, Wild West. You
get a lot of quacks and snake oil salesmen running around." 192 While
McCrary directs his skepticism at "snake oil salesman" who are not
members of or trained by the FBI, the same criticism could be leveled
fairly at FBI profilers who insist that instinct is required for their job
but simultaneously insist that it is a reliable form of expert testimony,
who reject criticism of their techniques but prefer well staged
courtroom performances over scientific validity. Until both FBItrained profilers and other amateur profilers stop avoiding or ignoring
attempts at scientific validation, courts should examine all expert
testimony on offender profiling with exacting scrutiny.
IV. A PRESUMPTION AGAINST SELF-VALIDATING TECHNIQUES
As the popularity of FBI offender profiling continues to
increase and its practitioners continue to enter the courtroom, trial
judges will face the question of the admissibility of offender profiling
testimony with more frequency. This Note has detailed the substantial
deficiencies of offender profiling's evidentiary reliability, has discussed
the challenges faced by trial judges in assuming the role of amateur
scientists in their gatekeeping duties and has presented instances
where trial and appellate courts have admitted expert offender
profiling testimony erroneously. A single solution to the myriad issues
raised by this form of expert testimony is difficult to formulate, but
reference to other discussions of expert testimony in criminal trials
serves as a starting point.
At least one scholar has argued that the admissibility of expert
testimony for the prosecution and defense should be evaluated under
organization in the world that specializes in the investigation of bizarre and brutal crimes,
testimony by members of the unit will always be powerful evidence.").
191. People v. Robbie, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 479, 482-83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Masters v. People,
58 P.3d 979, 985-87 (Colo. 2002).
192. Ramsland, supra note 182.
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different standards in criminal cases. 193 Professor Slobogin has argued
that Daubert and its progeny will limit the admissibility of defense
experts disproportionately (as compared to prosecution experts)
because defense theories are more likely to rely on claims about the
defendant's mental state.' 94 Prosecution theories, on the other hand,
are more likely to rely on testimony related to physical facts that are
more verifiable. 195 To adjust for the different theories underlying
defense and prosecution strategies, Professor Slobogin proposes that
courts should admit unverified defense expert testimony if (1) it is
"considered plausible among the relevant professionals" and (2) the
expert employed accepted evaluation methods. 196
The adoption of different admissibility standards is unlikely to
occur, as the Supreme Court rejected a more relaxed reliability
standard for the admission of polygraph tests offered by criminal
defendants in United States v. Scheffer. 19 7 An alternative admissibility
standard such as Professor Slobogin's, even if it were employed, still
would not correct trial courts' improper admission of offender profiling
submitted by the prosecution. At best, relaxed admissibility standards
would result only in more admissions of defendants' offender profiling
evidence, which this Note argues is unwarranted, rather than fewer
admissions of prosecutors' expert offender profiling testimony.
Professor Moreno has suggested that Professor Slobogin's
argument may be grounded in the type of expert testimony
introduced, rather than in which party is introducing it.198 For
example, both prosecution and defense expert testimony might be
subject to more permissive standards if the evidence relates to mental
state evidence and the more stringent Daubert requirements if it
relates to physical evidence. 199 But Professor Moreno rejects this
solution as both untenable and undesirable. 20 0 Even if this solution
was viable, it likely would produce the undesired result of increasing
the admission of expert offender profiling testimony proffered by the
prosecution. Rather than attempting to ground their technique in the
193. Christopher Slobogin, The Structure of Expertise in Criminal Cases, 34 SETON HALL L.
REV. 105, 108-09 (2003).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 110.
196. Id. at 124.
197. In Scheffer, the Court rejected a defendant's contention that stringent admissibility
standards prejudicially prevented the introduction of expert polygraph testimony to bolster his
credibility, reasoning that the defendant could have bolstered his credibility by testifying in his
own defense. 523 U.S. 303, 317 (1998).
198. Moreno, supra note 168, at 50.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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physical characteristics of the crime scene, profilers would be free to
characterize their testimony as inferences regarding the mental
characteristics of the offender, thus enjoying a more permissive
standard of admissibility.
Different admissibility standards are unlikely to correct the
problems associated with the admissibility of expert offender profiling
testimony; therefore, a more realistic solution may be to improve
existing admissibility standards. Professor Moreno has proposed that
admissibility standards can be improved in the context of law
enforcement testimony related to drug jargon, which, like offender
profiling, has been criticized for its self-validating nature and lack of
reliability. 20 1 Professor Moreno argues that drug jargon expert
testimony, which primarily is based on the expert's experience in law
enforcement, should be excluded "unless the expert can explain how
that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience
is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably
applied to the facts."20 2 Adopting Professor Moreno's proposal as a
starting point, this Note proposes a similar solution to the problem of
expert offender profiling testimony. This solution also may apply to
other forms of expert testimony proffered by experts in disciplines that
are created for the sole purpose of investigating or prosecuting crimes.
Expert testimony presented by law enforcement in criminal
trials is inherently different from expert testimony presented by those
with scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge in other fields.
Other fields of expertise do not exist for the express purpose of
investigating crimes or convicting criminal defendants; rather, they
typically exist for other purposes, and it is only later that practitioners
apply the field's techniques to criminal cases. For example, DNA
analysis originally was developed for purposes of biological research,
not criminal investigations. 20 3 Although it often is applied in criminal
investigations, and entire labs are now devoted to the analysis of DNA
evidence, its foundation remains as a biological science that only
secondarily informs criminal investigations. The analysis under
Daubert is fairly straightforward when judges consider the
admissibility of expert testimony related to disciplines outside of law
enforcement such as DNA analysis, as these techniques are grounded
in theories and methodologies that are not devoted solely to the
conviction of criminal defendants. For example, objective critiques of

201. Id. at 54.
202. Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee note) (internal quotations omitted).
203. See id. (citing DNA evidence as an example of an evidentiary method "derived from a
scientific field of well-established validity").
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existing methods are more likely to appear in the scholarly
publications of disciplines that exist independent of criminal
investigations because practitioners have an incentive to refine their
techniques to achieve the goals that originally animated the discipline.
In addition, a Daubert-style analysis is more equitable as between the
defense and prosecution in disciplines outside of criminal
investigations because experts are more or less equally available for
both sides, and law enforcement agencies are not in a position to exert
undue influence on experts testifying on behalf of defendants.
Experts in disciplines devoted primarily to the investigation
and prosecution of crimes, however, have the perverse incentive to
self-validate their techniques and avoid the theoretical and
methodological rigor that can produce disconfirming results. In
addition, individuals submitted as experts in these disciplines may
misrepresent-intentionally or unintentionally-the evidence that
exists to validate their technique. 204 Offender profiling experts have
asserted that published research exists to support offender profiling
by referring to the Crime Classification Manual,2 5 despite the fact
that this manual expressly states that no effort has been made to
validate its contents. 206 Finally, experts in disciplines devoted
primarily to criminal investigations and prosecutions may be
disinclined to appear or pressured against appearing as experts for the
defense.
For all of the above reasons, trial courts should adopt a
presumption against admitting testimony proffered by experts in
disciplines that are created for the sole purpose of investigating or
prosecuting crimes. Judges should insist on hearing convincing
evidence that the expert's discipline is reliable and valid, require the
expert to explain the assumptions underlying the technique in detail,
and determine whether the expert can apply the technique reliably to
individual cases.
To rebut the presumption, the party introducing the expert can
produce published literature supporting the technique. When
204. Such unintentional misrepresentation is more likely to occur as practitioners become
further removed from the individuals who originally developed the discipline.
205. Dr. Park Dietz, a highly regarded forensic psychiatrist and expert witness, made this
assertion during his pretrial testimony in the civil lawsuit against O.J. Simpson. He stated that
the best known work in crime scene analysis is the Crime ClassificationManual, then went on to
say that profiling is not a new scientific technique and should not be excluded by the trial court
under the Frye standard. See CourtTV Case Files, O.J. Simpson Transcript (Nov. 7, 1996),
availableat http://www.courttv.com/casefiles/simpson/transcripts/nov/novO7.html.
206. DOUGLAS ET AL., supra note 17, at 22 (indicating that "there have been no systematic
efforts to validate [the] profile-derived classifications" described by the Crime Classification
Manual).
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reviewing this literature, the judge should consider its source, content,
and relevance. This review need not be a scientific examination of the
literature, but the judge must demand more than the expert's
unsupported representations that the method is valid and reliable. For
instance, if a judge examined the Crime Classification Manual, she
would recognize that it is published by FBI agents and is not peerreviewed, and she may even discover that its introduction expressly
disclaims any validity for its method. If an expert does not have
published literature at his disposal to substantiate his technique, he
can produce personal records or a database of investigations in which
the technique was applied. The judge then can evaluate how
frequently the technique is used, how successful it is, how frequently
it produces errors, the nature and magnitude of its errors, and so
forth. In addition, this requirement will force experts to disclose to
opposing counsel information and data regarding their techniques,
thus alleviating a recurrent information asymmetry faced by
opponents of law enforcement techniques.
Unfortunately, this presumption apparently is necessary to
incentivize some law enforcement experts to validate their theories
and methodologies scientifically. Ironically, a strong presumption
against the admission of un-validated offender profiling testimony
may dovetail with profilers' long term goal of more effectively
identifying and prosecuting serial murderers and rapists. As scientists
empirically examine offender profiling, they may discover new
techniques that not only are logically coherent, scientifically valid, and
admissible as expert testimony, but also are more effective and
reliable than current techniques at identifying unknown offenders. To
this end, FBI profilers and other practitioners of law enforcement
techniques should make their methods and data more widely available
and encourage scientific validation.
V. CONCLUSION

This Note makes a valuable contribution to scholarly research
related to the admissibility of expert offender profiling testimony
introduced in high-stakes murder and rape cases. Scholars have not
explored whether courts admit or reject expert offender profiling
testimony, perhaps because they believed that judges rarely, if ever,
would admit it in criminal trials due to its prejudicial nature as
character evidence. However, this Note demonstrates that trial and
appellate courts have permitted the use of offender profiling when the
prosecution introduces it as expert testimony related to crime scene
analysis, which can effectively disguise its prejudicial features. In
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addition, this Note supplements existing critiques of linkage analysis
by demonstrating the limitations of the theoretical and methodological
assumptions that underlie both offender profiling and linkage
analysis.
This Note proposes a judicial presumption against the
admission of expert testimony related to disciplines developed
primarily for use in criminal investigations and prosecutions. Experts
can rebut this presumption by producing convincing, objective
evidence of the validity of the discipline, as well as its propensity for
reliable application to individual cases. A presumption against
admission is necessary to incentivize practitioners in disciplines
related solely to the investigation and prosecution of crimes to analyze
objectively and validate their techniques. This presumption also will
help compensate for the inability of defense counsel to access experts
in these disciplines. Such a presumption also will limit testimony from
practitioners who are far removed from the original developers of the
discipline and who casually may overstate or exaggerate the validity
of the discipline. Finally, this presumption is preferable from a policy
perspective because criminal defendants in cases where offender
profiling testimony is proffered typically are facing convictions for
murder or rape-and the severe sentences that accompany these
crimes-so trial courts should be especially guarded against wellstaged performances and glorified results.
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